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International Agriculture Research Centres (IARCs) and other public research 
organisations increasingly find themselves exposed to intellectual property rights due 
to inter alia the advent of the intellectual property system, privatisation of research and 
increased collaboration with the private sector. There is an inherent theoretical conflict 
in the application of private rights for the provision of public goods given that IPRs 
introduce excludability to a good. But there is a distinction between the existence and 
exercise of IPRs. The latter, conducted creatively, can mitigate the excludability effect 
brought about by the former. Examples of the creative exercise of IPRs illustrate that 
IP capacity is vital. IARCs and other public research organisations particularly those in 
developing countries must invest in IP capacity in order to formulate creative IP 
policies and strategies and implement them in a manner that ensures their public goods 





Recent developments in the international arena have exposed public sector research 
organisations – including those dealing with development issues such as agriculture – 
to intellectual property rights (IPRs). The advent of the international IPR regime and 
the concomitant protection of research tools and other technologies vital for research, 
the increased role of the private sector in agriculture, and the proliferation of public 
private partnerships (PPPs) are some of the developments that have transformed 
international agricultural research.  
 
This paper explores the implications of applying IPRs in the conduct of agricultural 
research for public benefit. It argues that there is an inherent theoretical conflict in the 
application of IPRs in the provision of public goods such as agricultural research. 
However, an analysis of this effect is illuminating: there is a distinct difference in the 
existence and the exercise of IPRs. While the existence of private rights in the 
provision of public goods is in conflict theoretically, the way in which IPRs are 
exercised can mitigate this conflict. Whilst the evolution of IPRs moves agricultural 
research towards being a private good, reactionary, interventionist and other policy 
approaches may mitigate and/or reverse the trend. Public research organisations which 
find themselves exposed to IPRs must concentrate on ways that ensure the exercise of 
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IPRs does not compromise their mandate for public goods research. This crucially 
requires investment in IP capacity and inter alia, the formulation of creative policies 
and strategies that address the paradox of serving the public interest through the use of 
public rights.  
 
This article begins with a brief examination of the classical division of public and 
private goods in the context of agricultural research. Next, it enquires into the 
implications of applying IPRs in the conduct of public agricultural research and 
highlights when and why public agricultural research organisations apply or deal with 
IPRs. A brief analysis of IP policies in the Consultative Group on International 
Agriculture Research (CGIAR) follows; this shows that the CGIAR centres have 
policies that contemplate the existence of IPRs; the creative exercise of IPRs is 
demonstrated by use of a few examples from the IARCs.  
 
Public goods and private goods   
 
The main line of inquiry in this section is whether the characteristics of a good 
determine what sector is best suited to provide the said good. It necessarily begins with 
the examination of the nature of public and private goods. The goal is to determine 
what happens when pubic goods are provided through the use of private rights. Do they 
still remain public goods? A secondary question is whether the public sector is the 
generally most suited sector to provide public goods and if so, what happens when the 
exception pertains.   
 
The debate on classification of goods can be traced back to Samuelson (1954) and 
Musgrave (1959). Samuelson used the “jointness of consumption” as the main attribute 
to divide all goods into two classes: private consumption goods and public 
consumption goods. According to Samuelson, “collective consumption goods” are 
those goods  
 
‘… which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual’s consumption of that good…’ (Samuelson 1954:1) 
Jointness of consumption is also referred to as non rivalry, nonrivalry of consumption 
or indivisibility of benefits. Some authors do indeed use the terms interchangeably 
(Cornes & Sandler 1996). 
 
Musgrave on the other hand argued that a different attribute – whether someone can be 
excluded from benefiting once the good is produced (excludability) – was more 
important that Samuelson’s rivalness attribute. Both aimed to show when market 
forces would perform optimally in the provision of specific classification of goods and 
when markets would fail.  
 
Public goods are contrasted to private goods which are said to be rivalrous and 
excludable. Because few goods fall neatly into these two categories, other categories 
such as impure public goods and common pool resource are now recognised in 
addition to the two classical groups. Drahos underscores this by stating that ‘a public 
good is not a single good, but an effect with complex antecedents made up of a set of 
complementary goods (private and public) and different types of social actors’ 
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(Drahos, 2004). Generally, these two criteria are used to distinguish pure public goods 
from private goods. 
 
Pure public goods are therefore non-rivalrous and non-excludable so as to be 
accessible to growing numbers of people without any marginal cost. This quality – 
wide dispersion of benefits – renders them unsuitable for private entrepreneurship. 
Pure public goods are thus best provided for by the state.  
 
Examples of pure public goods have been dwindling since the critique of the classical 
examples of the lighthouse and of national defence. It is now widely acknowledged 
that goods rarely fall neatly within the above criteria hence the recognition of club 
goods and common pool resources. According to Samuelson (1954), rivalrous goods, 
whether excludable or not could be efficiently provided through market mechanisms 
while Musgrave (1959), arguing that excludability was the determining factor, 
contended that market mechanisms are preferable for those goods that are excludable 
whether rivalrous or not. Similarly, Cornes & Sandler (1996) argue that 
nonexcludability is the crucial factor in determining which goods must be provided by 
the public sector.  
 
The difficulty at assigning goods along the rivalry – excludability spectrum impacts on 
policy decisions on the provision of goods. Samuelson himself conceded that many 
goods commonly termed as public goods do not fit within his definition; (Samuelson, 
1955) a significant amount of literature has been generated since some of which 
attempts to clarify and develop models relating to ‘mixed goods’ – those that lie 
somewhere between the extremes of pure private and pure public goods (e.g. 
Holtermann, 1972). 
 
Indeed some public goods appear to have a mixture of private goods and public goods 
characteristics. Examples can be found in education, health, agriculture and the justice 
system where in practice, these are not consumed in equal amounts by everyone and 
one person’s consumption decreases the amount available for other people to consume. 
Indeed, very few goods are truly public; it is the way they are made available and 
utilised that makes them public or not. Holtermann (1972) distinguishes between the 
provision and utilisation of a public good; its provision may be public in so far as it is 
equally available for everyone’s consumption but its utilisation may contain aspects of 
private goods in that utilisation is different for different individuals and an increase in 
one person’s utilisation decreases the amount available to others. Similarly, Pickhardt 
observes that most goods which give rise to private benefits also involve externalities 
in varying degrees thereby combining both public and private good characteristics 
(Pickhardt, 2002). 
 
In determining if a good is a pure public good or a mixed good, Holtermann (1972) 
maintains that this will depend on whether an individual consumption unit can be 
defined and secondly, whether consumption is in the control of the consumer, at least 
in principle. He however concedes that the dividing line is not clear. Technology plays 
a part in blurring the distinction between public and private goods. For example, 
advances in ICT such as digital right management, encryption etc allow media 
companies to exclude customers from cable and satellite TV reception. Given that the 
world is finite, resources in it are finite too and the economic concept of scarcity 
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applies ubiquitously so that public goods are not exempt. Strict non rivalry is therefore 
not possible (Musgrave, 1959, 1969). 
 
The foregoing highlights the difficulty in clearly demarcating goods into pure public 
and private goods. The characteristics of a good generally determine what category it 
falls into; who provides the good is not a factor in determining whether a good is 
public or private. Most goods lie along the public goods – private goods continuum 
with characteristics of both public and private goods; the provision of such goods may 
be by either the public or private sectors or other sectors or a combination of any of 
these.  
 
Agriculture research as a public good 
 
But is agriculture research a pure public good? It is undisputed that the social returns to 
research investment (even when conducted by the private sector) possess some degree 
of public goods characteristics. Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962) and others (Mansfield et. 
al., 1977; Ruttan, 2001) argued that social returns from private investment exceed 
private returns. Therefore, research conducted in public and private sectors and in 
combination of the two is likely to produce public goods. Gardner and Lesser (2003) 
argue that public agriculture research however does not produce pure public goods but 
impure public goods: some users cannot be excluded or charged for some uses of the 
goods produced. Dalrymple (2008) similarly posits that particularly due to its 
interaction with private research, public agricultural research is increasingly providing 
impure public goods rather than pure public goods.  
 
Agriculture in its simplest form is no doubt a mixed good in that it contains both 
elements of public and private goods. The end product of agriculture – food – is a 
private good in so far as it is both rivalrous (once consumed, it no longer exists) and 
excludable (the owner can exclude others from consuming it). The land on which food 
is grown is likewise a private good. However, the technology and knowledge required 
in growing agronomically appropriate crops of high quality and yield is non-rivalrous. 
Further, the benefits of a healthy well fed nation impact on society as a whole. As such, 
government involvement in the provision of this mixed good is vital in order to ensure 
the overall positive social effect. This is particularly important in the present time 
given the growing disparity in wealth allocation exacerbated by changes brought about 
by globalisation (Duncan, 2005).   
 
IPRs and the correction of market failure 
 
In an ideal market, the price of each good should be equal to the cost borne by society 
in consuming it. If goods are produced above marginal cost, they will be under-
consumed; if they are provided at marginal cost (free) they will tend to be under-
produced as there will be no incentive to invest in their production. Pure public goods 
and some impure public goods represent the second scenario. Different mechanisms 
are used to correct this market failure; IPRs and government intervention are but two 
ways.  
 
It would seem that knowledge or technology is a public good in that it is nonrival, 
nonexcludable and has positive externalities. IPRs alter the nature of technology from 
public to private by introducing excludability although not rivalry. Put simply, 
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technology is expensive to produce and cheap to reproduce. Through licensing and 
royalties, some consumers are excluded although the technology remains nonrivalrous. 
However, even encumbered by IPRs, technology is still transformative. It may convert 
some public goods into private ones and vice versa.  
 
The application of IPRs can result in under-consumption such as when IPRs result in 
vital drugs being prohibitively expensive so as to be out of reach of poor people. 
Barder (2003) distinguishes the application of IPRs to rival goods from their 
application to non-rival goods. He posits that when a good’s consumption is rival, 
imposition of property rights helps to improve the use of scarce resources but argues 
that when applied to non-rival goods (such as knowledge), IPRs move society away 
from an optimum allocation of resources.  
 
Barder (2003) explores different ways of rewarding creators of knowledge observing 
that the different ways have different distributional implications, different welfare 
impacts and influence nature of R&D differently. IPRs may lead to the pricing of 
important welfare goods e.g. crops protected by plant variety rights out of poor 
people’s reach. The Golden Rice case where extensive patenting delayed research into 
beta-carotene fortified rice is a case in point. Application of IPRs may also distort 
research priorities such as when private companies choose to invest in commercial 
crops and neglect pro-poor orphan crops. This is especially important given that six 
companies hold 75 percent of all agricultural patents (Phillips, 2004) increasing the 
risk of non-delivery of agricultural inventions to the poor. 
 
Even Adam Smith, the most ardent advocate of laissez-faire, recognised the need for 
government intervention in some select areas. This is needed in health, education and 
agriculture to reverse market failure, reduce transaction costs so as to enhance 
consumption or supply and hence positive externalities. Government intervention is 
needed to redirect research according to social value so as to promote creation of 
knowledge in areas with highest social return rather than according to the highest 
opportunity for rent extraction. This is particularly important given that the 
distributional impact of IPRs, social welfare costs and distortion of R&D are greater 
now than ever before. Research into problems affecting the poor is increasingly 
marginalised over the development of IP for which rich consumers are willing to pay.  
 
 
The implications of applying IPRs in the provision of public goods 
 
As earlier seen, IPRs introduce excludability into public goods. IPRs can be said to 
reverse Holtermann’s classification according to which firstly, the provision of public 
goods has public characteristics in that the goods are equally available to all. The 
application of IPRs reverses this: the provision of public goods to which IPRs have 
been applied acquire private characteristics i.e. the goods may be available to all but 
are only accessible to those who can pay the added royalty costs (assuming these are 
present). Secondly, utilisation of public goods according to Holtermann has private 
characteristics: one person’s consumption reduces the amount available for others’ 
consumption e.g. hospital beds in health care, access to justice in the court system, etc. 
Where IPRs are applied to public goods, excludability in the provision of the goods 
concerned is traded off against non rivalry in the utilisation of the knowledge: the 
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knowledge can be copied endlessly without being diminished and one person’s 
consumption does not subtract from others’ consumption.  
 
The main objective of public research organisations is presumed to be the provision of 
research products for the general public. Most public research organisations will 
particularly focus on research affecting the marginalized sections of the public. The 
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In theory therefore, there is an innate conflict in the application of IPRs to the 
provision of public goods. How does a public research organisation apply IPRs (which 
introduce excludability) while still maintaining their mandate to provide goods equally 
available and accessible to all? This inherent theoretical conflict has been the subject of 
many a debate; different public research organisations have had various reactions to 
this conflict between the philosophy of public research and the existence of IPRs.   
 
Having established that there is an inherent conflict (at least in theory) of the 
application of IPRs to the provision of public goods, it has to be asked why public 
research organisations are faced with this dilemma. Why apply IPRs at all?  
 
Why and when are public agricultural research organisations exposed to IPRs?   
 
Trends in the last two decades are responsible for the exposure of public research 
organisations to IPRs. These include but are not limited to: a decline in public research 
funds and the pressure to generate income, the privatisation of research and the advent 
of the IP system.   
provision utilisation 
Public CCCs Private CCCs 
Equally available to all 
Different for different people – one 
person’s consumption reduces the amount 





Not equally accessible 
(available but not 
accessible to all) 
Non-rivalrous – one person’s 
consumption does not subtract from 
others’ consumption 
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The past decade has seen a constant decline in funds allocated for research in 
agriculture. In the face of many competing claims on donor aid, international 
agricultural research no longer commands priority in funding (Blakeney, 2002). Donor 
aid to IARCs increasingly hinges on the impact of institutions’ research.  One effect of 
this is the trend from basic to applied research and the subsequent involvement of other 
partners, including the private sector, in downstream product development. Another 
effect of public research budget austerity is the increasing pressure on IARCs to 
commercialise their products to supplement their income. Although income generation 
is hardly the main factor motivating patenting (or other form of IP protection) of 
research in IARCs, the reality is that IP protection has the potential to generate income 
for IARCs. 
 
The changing agricultural R&D scene has raised vital issues which IARCs and other 
public research organisations have to address. Not the least of these is the question of 
whether income generation is consistent with the wider mandate of public research 
organisations to serve the needs of the poor farmers and maximise benefits to society 
as a whole (Fischer & Byerlee, 2002). Public research organisations face the challenge 
of balancing the need for income generation and that of the delivery of public goods.  
 
There is perhaps no greater factor that has contributed more in exposing public 
research organisations to IPRs than the privatisation of research. Globalisation of R&D 
and the growing assertion of ownership of agricultural resources through the 
application of IPRs by both the private and the public sectors characterise the 
environment under which IARCs and other public research organisations currently 
operate.  
 
In the fields of agriculture and health, partnerships between the public and the private 
sector enjoy remarkable acclaim and are currently hailed as crucial strategies for the 
delivery of global public goods in the respective fields. In some of these instances, the 
use of IPRs by public research institutes may be key in achieving the goal of promoting 
access. This is particularly true where private sector partners are required for say, the 
development, manufacture and or distribution of public research. In international 
agricultural research for example, it is common place for IARCs to partner with seed 
companies for the multiplication and distribution of seed.  
 
In product development partnerships, IPRs facilitate the engagement of the private 
sector by providing crucial bargaining chips. IPRs are sometimes used to segment the 
market thereby enabling the achievement of public goods goal particularly in 
developing countries. For example, IPRs to a technology may be traded off for 
contractual obligations to deliver the product to developing countries at a reasonable 
price, i.e. the developed markets can be traded for control of sales in developing 
markets so as to ensure that demand in the latter is met. An example in health is 
research in malaria where the ‘paying market’ is low, the research partners may trade 
any other disease use for control of the IP for the neglected disease; the commercial 
partners may acquire the rights to the foreground IP pertaining to all other diseases 
save for the pro-poor disease the partnership addresses.   
  
Although it is generally argued that patenting research tools inhibits further research 
and thereby limits innovation (e.g. Wright & Pardey, 2006; Clift, 2007), Boettiger and 
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Chi-ham (2007) argue that where access to complementary enabling technologies 
necessary to produce a product is blocked, an institution with a patent to one of the 
research tools required has more leverage than one that does not. They argue that ‘if an 
IP manager chooses not to patent an enabling technology... the ability to control its 
applications is lost’ (Boettiger & Chi-ham, 2007:38). Control of research products and 
tools then becomes a reason to seek IPRs. Policy questions of whether research tools 
should be patented aside, the reality is that public research organisations are more 
likely to patent enabling technologies now than they were in the past.  
 
The same applies to subsequent improvement patents. Contrasting an IP manager who 
chooses not to patent a technology to one who does, Boettiger & Chi-ham posit that in 
the former case, ‘improvements to the technology are subsequently invented and 
patented, restricting the uses of the original technology’. In the latter, ‘the value of the 
subsequent improvement patent would depend on access to the underlying dominant 
patent’ (Boettiger & Chi-ham, 2007:38). These examples demonstrate the ‘reactionary’ 
nature that some public research institutes adopt in the current environment 
characterised by increasing privatisation of research.  
 
Legal developments in some countries have transformed the public research 
environment and catalysed the public sector’s engagement with IPRs. A ready example 
is the United States’ Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980 which allowed federally funded 
universities to patent their research and license it to the private sector in line with 
‘translational research’ objectives. University-industry partnerships and collaborations 
in the US increased dramatically as did university patents following the 
implementation of the Act.  
 
Funding agreements with donors have similarly been known to expose public research 
institutes to IPRs by containing IP related clauses. It is not uncommon for funding 
agreements, particularly in product development public-private partnerships (PPPs), to 
reserve the right to retain control of the IP especially in late stage product 
development. This is often a safety net strategy to ensure production of the relevant 
technology in the event that a private sector partner forestalls the development of the 
designated product.  
 
The advent of the IP regime has had a significant impact on the international 
agricultural research conducted for example by the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR of CG). The CG is a strategic alliance of 
governments, donors and global research partners whose mission is to achieve 
sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific 
research and research related activities. Research is conducted through fifteen IARCs. 
The CGIAR is the largest public investor in agricultural research in developing 
countries.  
 
One of the ways in which this has occurred relates to the risk of seeking IP protection 
for CG germplasm by third parties. A number of high-profile cases occurring in the 
late 1990s bear evidence to this. In 1998, PBR applications were made in Australia for 
accessions obtained from two CG centres (Edwards & Anderson, 1998). Research by 
the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (the ETC group, then 
known as the Rural Advancement Foundation International, RAFI) indicates that there 
could be more cases of this nature (RAFI, 1998). In developing countries, it is likely 
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that such abuse of CG germplasm is carried out not only by the private sector in the 
form of the numerous small seed companies, but also by partners in National 
Agriculture Research Institutes (NARIs) in spite of the Material Transfer Agreements 
(MTAs) that are used to transfer CG germplasm to third parties.  
 
Protecting technology has in some cases attracted the involvement of the private sector. 
In some of the collaborations with the private sector, the probability of developing 
proprietary technology with significant commercial implications cannot be ruled out as 
an important incentive for the private sector. In other cases, private seed companies, 
recognising the competitively high quality of plant genetic material bred by the CG 
centres, have been reluctant to distribute seed from the centres unless they can do so 
exclusively.   
 
Similarly, dealings with the private sector have heightened the need for public research 
institutions to be IP savvy not in the least because of the danger of infringing IP 
belonging to a third party (Wolson, 2004) and the requirement to obtain freedom to 
operate.  In other instances, IARCs use IPRs in order to ensure their technology is in 
the public domain. This is in accordance with the typical public research organisations’ 
IP policy objective.   
 
These are only a snapshot of the IP challenges that CG centres have to address in the 
context of research, commercialisation and protection of their products. 
 
How do public agricultural research institutes reconcile IPRs with the fulfilment 
of their mandates?  
 
The preceding section looked at potential reasons why, and circumstances where, 
public research organisations use intellectual property rights or are exposed to dealing 
with IPRs. Summarised, these are income generation, facilitating the delivery of 
research products to the public via the private sector, obtaining leverage with the 
private sector, avoiding infringing technologies protected by third parties and in order 
to avail research products in the public domain.  
 
With regard to income generation, although the sale of IP protected research products 
can be beneficial in funding research costs, there is little formal analysis of the 
significance of the gains from using IP protection as a strategy for generating new 
revenues for research (Maredia, 2001). IARCs and other public research organisations 
can employ a number of ways to generate income to offset their budget deficit. Sale of 
non-research products and services such as soil and chemical testing, diagnostic tests, 
sale of commercial seed and vaccines and staff consultancies are income generating 
activities that are generally within the mandate of agricultural public research 
organisations. In the other instances above, it is more difficult to substitute other 
practices for the use of IPRs. This is where the creative exercise of IPRs is paramount.  
 
So far, we have established that firstly, there is a conflict in theory in the application of 
IPRs in the provision of public goods. Secondly, public research organisations 
including IARCs increasingly find themselves having to use IP protected research tools 
and products belonging to third parties and in some instances, having to protect their 
own research products by use of IPRs.  
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This requires the creative exercise of IPRs. The excludability effect of IPR encumbered 
technology can be mitigated by policy and institutional changes. Consider that 
Microsoft in 2006 released 500 ICT patents before their expiry. CABI (a not-for-profit 
organisation specialising in scientific research, publishing and communication) agreed 
to put its books on the internet six months after their publication and on CD free of 
charge for developing countries. Private biotech firms have in some cases allowed 
freedom to operate (FTO) provisions to facilitate the use of IP protected technology in 
developing countries where it is unlikely that their commercial interests will be 
affected (Ryan, 2006). In 2000, Harold Vamus, Patrick Brown and Michael Eisen 
proposed the publication of high quality scientific journals under open access free 
PLoS journals. This system has proved to be successful; a publication in a PLos journal 
almost has the same impact factor as that that in Science or Nature. 
 
These few examples illustrate that the existence of IPRs need not impair the provision 
of protected technology to the public; the policies underlying these decisions mitigate 
the excludability effect introduced when IPRs are applied to goods. The following 
section looks at the IP guidelines and policies relating to the Consultative Group on 
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR or CG) to determine firstly, if they 
contemplate the existence of IPRs and secondly, if and how they allow for the exercise 
of IPRs in a manner that mitigates the excludability effect thereby safeguarding the 
constituent centres’ public goods mandate.  
 
The CGIAR  
 
The CGIAR is a strategic alliance of countries, international and regional 
organizations, and private foundations supporting 15 international agricultural centres. 
These CG centres work with national agricultural research systems and civil society 
organizations as well as the private sector. The CGIAR’s mission is “to achieve 
sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific 
research and research-related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
policy, and environment.” The CGIAR expressly states that it “generates global public 
goods that are available to all.” 
 
Material held by the CG centres falls broadly under two categories: the Ex situ 
germplasm collection held in trust otherwise known as designated germplasm; and 
breeding material developed by the individual centres. Virtually all of the ex situ 
germplasm collection is from countries in the South. There has been considerable 
debate over the status of this genetic material, to whom the CG is accountable and 
whether or not it is subject to IP protection. The FAO International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (the ITPGR or the Treaty) attempts to 
answer these issues. The Treaty establishes a Multilateral System of access and benefit 
sharing into which contracting parties are obliged to place plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture (PGRFA) under their management and control. The PGRFA to 
placed into the Multilateral System are listed in the Treaty’s Annex 1. Eleven of the 
fifteen CG centres joined the Treaty as contracting parties in October 2006.  
 
IP policy in the CGIAR system 
 
The CG contemplated developing working principles on IP as early as 1991. These 
have had to be continually reviewed owing to a number of factors. To begin with, the 
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CBD came into force in 1993 with great implications for access to genetic resources. In 
addition, the centres entered into an agreement with FAO in 1994 bringing their 
germplasm collection under the international network of ex situ collections. Further, 
the WTO Multilateral Trade Agreement under which the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs) falls came into force in 1995. The TRIPs Agreement 
obliges all WTO member countries to enact and enforce legislation governing 
intellectual property. All CGIAR member countries are members of the WTO and 
virtually all countries within which the CG centres operate are WTO members.   
 
A panel on IPRs was set up in 1994 whose report included recommendations on IP 
management by centres. The Guiding Principles on IP and Genetic Resources 
emanated from these recommendations. The Guiding Principles address various issues 
such as sovereignty, farmers’ rights, biosafety and IP protection. The CG system has 
an unusual legal structure. The system is no more than an alliance; it has no legal 
status. As such system wide documents are often in the form of guiding principles. 
Where there are CG policies, these have to be adopted by the individual centres whose 
interpretation and implementation of the policies is not always uniform. Regarding IP, 
the governing and guiding documents are numerous. Firstly, there are the international 
instruments: the Treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
ubiquitous TRIPs Agreement. Secondly, there is the 1994 agreement signed between 
the CG centres and the Food and Agriculture Organisation; this governs non-Annex 1 
ex situ germplasm collected before the Treaty came into force. Thirdly, there are the 
various system level IP guiding principles and finally, at the centre level are the 
individual centres’ IP policies, material transfer agreements (MTAs) and other 
contracts.  
 
In enquiring if the IP policies allow for the mitigation of the excludability effect, this 
section looks at the provisions relating to whether the CG centres and third parties can 
seek IP protection for research products from both designated germplasm and centre 
bred material.  
 
Can CG centres seek IPRs for research products from designated germplasm and 
centre bred material? 
 
As per the terms of the guiding principles, centres can only seek IP protection where 
either, protection is needed to facilitate technology transfer, or protection is otherwise 
needed to protect the interests of developing nations. A template for IP policy 
statements recently approved by the CG Committee on Genetic Resources Policy 
places emphasis on the centres’ need for full disclosure into the public domain, sharing 
of materials, data and information generated by centres. It exhorts the centres to pursue 
publication as their basic IP policy and to seek IPRs only when necessary to serve the 
poor. In all instances, the centre concerned must disclose the reasons for seeking 
protection. The template list situations where this may be acceptable as: 
 
“ i. To engage in public and private partnerships which pursue mission-
based research; 
ii. to ensure ready access; 
iii. to avoid possible restrictions arising from “blocking” patents and to 
ensure Centre’s ability to pursue its research without undue 
hindrance; 
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iv. to ensure the effective transfer of technology, research products and 
other benefits to the resource poor. 
 
Although the template is not intended to replace the IP policy statements or the MTAs, 
it is important in that it clarifies statements in the previous documents and is intended 
to ensure that individual centres’ statements address all the relevant issues “in a 
consistent and harmonious manner.”  
 
The policy and MTAs emphasise that IP protection should not be seen as a means for 
securing financial returns although in some cases the reality is that IP protection may 
be a source of operating funds.  
 
Cells, organelles, genes and molecular constructs can be patented, even those isolated 
from designated germplasm. Permission from the relevant centre has to be sought 
however, and this will be given only after consultation with countries of origin of the 
relevant germplasm (where this is known or can be readily identified). This is in 
accordance with the requirements of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
 
An instance where protection may be sought is if it helps promote collaborative 
partnerships which speed up the development of new products and services and 
facilitates their deployment to the end users – the poor farmers in developing countries. 
CG centres may enter into agreement with right holders of protected material but only 
to facilitate access and availability of the material to developing nations and only when 
the benefits of such collaboration outweigh the potential disadvantages. In all cases, 
the requirements mentioned above must be met.  
 
In deciding whether or not to seek IP protection, CG centres must consider the 
transaction cost and the incident management burden (Maredia & Erbisch, 1998). Even 
though monetary gains by themselves should not determine the decision of the CG 
centres whether or not to protect a technology, they are nonetheless important and have 
to be considered in the decision making process.  
 
 
Can third parties seek IPRs for research products from designated germplasm 
and centre bred material? 
 
Under the CG guiding principles, designated germplasm is not subject to IP protection 
or legal claim by centres or other recipients. The FAO/CG centres’ Agreement 
categorically states that the ‘Centre shall not claim legal ownership over the designated 
germplasm, nor shall it seek any intellectual property rights over that germplasm or 
related information.’ The Treaty governs all Annex 1 ex situ/designated germplasm (as 
well as Annex 1 centre bred material) and states that recipients of material from the 
Multilateral System “shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit 
the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their 
genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System.”  The 
Treaty does not define what ‘in the form received’ means leaving this open to various 
interpretations.  
 
Designated germplasm or centre bred material can be used by recipients for breeding 
purposes, research and training. The recipients include the private sector. The 
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recipients may seek protection for the resulting products of breeding through PBRs. 
The recipients cannot preclude others from using the original material. Unlike 
patenting which requires the relevant centre’s approval, third parties do not need 
permission to seek PBRs on research products from designated germplasm or centre 
bred material. The CG guiding principles fail to address this. What constitutes 
‘resulting products’ is not defined and it is therefore unclear how much development to 
the original material is required before a recipient can claim PBRs over the ‘resulting 
product’.  
 
Do CG centres have the authority to allow third parties to seek IPRs for research 
products from designated germplasm and centre bred material? 
 
There has been considerable debate on the question of the centres’ authority to permit 
third parties to exploit genetic resources held in trust. Designated germplasm is 
generally considered to be held in trust by the CG centres. Under the trustee principle, 
a trustee’s duty is to keep control of and preserve trust property. One of the issues 
arising from this is whether a CG centre can permit a third party to secure IP rights 
over germplasm held in trust (Blakeney, 2002). This question does not seem to have 
been answered directly by the CGIAR at the policy level although it can be argued that 
if the ultimate end of allowing third parties to seek IP protection for research products 
from designated germplasm and centre bred material is to benefit the poor, and 
facilitate the CG centre fulfil its mandate, then it would appear that the CG centre 
would be acting within its trustee obligations. As the various policy documents 
currently stand, this issue of trusteeship does not seem to be appreciated thereby 
allowing for the IP protection of material by third parties for their own commercial 
interests. 
 
Being the owner of centre bred material, a centre has authority to allow third party to 
seek IPRs for research products derived from the centre developed material. The 
transfer of this material to recipients is however under the Treaty’s standard material 
transfer agreement (for Annex 1 PGRFA), the centre specific MTA (for non Annex 1 
pre Treaty material) and according to the CBD, the agreement between the centre and 
the host government and other applicable national laws (for non Annex 1 post Treaty 
material). As such, the conditions under these instruments must be respected.  
 
The CG Centre Directors’ Committee Statement in 1998 identified areas that need 
further clarification. Among these were the issues of benefit sharing for IPRs on centre 
bred material and whether and when to allow for IP protection on centre bred material 
where there was no significant input by the recipient or when more than one recipient 
in a country requests permission to apply for IPRs (Bragdon, 2000). These are still 
outstanding issues as is what to do with plant genetic material developed jointly with 
other partners including the private sector. The alliance of CG centres is currently 
drafting a new policy on intellectual assets which could substantially alter the system’s 
current guiding principles.  
 
There is no doubt that the treaties, policies and agreements discussed above 
contemplate the use of IP by the CG centres and by recipients of plant genetic material 
held and developed by the centres. The spirit underlying these instruments is in line 
with keeping the centres’ research products in the public domain.  
 




Balancing the provision of public goods and the use of IPRs 
 
The exercise of IPRs in a manner ensuring that protected products are maintained in 
the public domain as much as possible goes beyond the creation of ‘public domain 
friendly’ policies. Whilst this is an important first step, implementation of those 
policies and agreements is crucial in balancing the equation between public goods and 
private rights. The use of IPRs in the CG centres is relatively recent; most research 
projects with potential or actual proprietary technology are ongoing and it could take a 
while before the effect of using IPRs is seen downstream.  
 
An example of a completed project which illustrates the exercise of IPRs in this regard 
is the Golden Rice project. This was a product development partnership between the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI, one of the CG centres) and various private 
partners whose objective was to create rice fortified with beta-carotene in order to 
address the pervasive vitamin A deficiency in rice growing regions. The freedom to 
operate review showed that about 70 patents (including applications) were applicable 
to the improved rice. This potential constraint was resolved by ‘a straightforward IP 
management strategy’. Krattiger & Potrykus (2007:12) report that ‘contrary to what 
many commentators state, the licensing process was relatively uncomplicated, with the 
involvement of commercially experienced people.’  
 
Judging from the number of patents involved and the number of licenses issued, the 
process could only have been uncomplicated because of the involvement of 
commercially and IP savvy people (public relations and other factors aside). Moreover, 
a lot of the IP capacity particularly regarding negotiation must have been from the 
private sector: ‘These core patents were licensed to Zeneca… [which] then negotiated 
access to all possibly necessary patents, including intellectual property from [other 
companies].’ (Krattiger & Potrykus, 2007: 12)    
 
The Zeneca-led negotiations resulted in all the companies providing access to their 
technologies ‘free of charge for defined humanitarian research and use of Golden Rice 
in developing countries’ (Krattiger & Potrykus, 2007: 12). Golden Rice is available 
under humanitarian use which is defined as use in developing countries by resource-
poor farmers (earning less than US$10,000 per year from farming). This provision is 
an example of how the excludability effect of IPRs can be reversed to ensure the 
public’s access to protected technology.  
 
Another example of creative exercise of IPRs is a partnership between Donald 
Danforth Plant Science Centre (a US not-for-profit plant sciences research institute), 
Sathguru Management Consultants and the International Crops Research Institute for 
Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT, a CG centre) for the development of groundnuts 
resistant to tobacco streak virus, a disease that decimated groundnut production in 
India with losses of more than US$65million in 2000. The partnership acquired coat 
protein (CP) technology (vital for conferring resistance to the viral infection) from 
Monsanto through a non-assert agreement. This allowed the CP technology to be used 
for non profit public good. The CP technology is available free of royalties and upfront 
payments to public institutions planning to develop the varietal groundnut (Medakker 
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& Vijayaraghavan, 2007).  Partnership was able to negotiate for the CP technology 
from Monsanto through a non-assert agreement demonstrating the need for IP capacity.  
The non-assert agreement itself is an example of how protected technology can be 
made available to the public.  
 
Open source biotechnology is another option increasingly cited as having the potential 
to mitigate the excludability effect in IPRs thereby balancing private rights with the 
provision of public goods. Similar to the open source software model this entails 
pooling together technologies which are then made freely available under specified 
terms. The practical workings of open source biotechnology are however yet to be put 
to test.  An often cited example of open source biotechnology is CAMBIA’s open 
technology bank called BIOS. CAMBIA is an Australian non profit organisation that 
engages in life sciences based research. BIOS is a technology development and sharing 
initiative where protected technology is freely available for users who have to 
contribute the improvements they make to the core toolkit under the terms of the 
Biological Open Source Licence.   
 
The use of non-assert agreements, humanitarian licenses and other contracts that 
ensure the public goods mandate of public research organisations is not compromised 
requires IP capacity including that in drafting appropriate clauses and contracts, IP 
negotiation with third parties and research partners and overall IP management. The 





The characteristics of a good generally determine whether it is public or private. 
‘Publicness’ and ‘privateness’ are however not innate properties – goods move along 
the public good – private good continuum meaning that in many instances, a good 
could be produced by the private sector, the public sector, other sectors or any 
combination of these. Agriculture research is an impure public good and its provision 
requires a multiple of authorities and actors, as do most mixed goods.  
 
IPRs introduce excludability to public goods. There is therefore an inherent theoretical 
conflict in the application of IPRs to public goods. International Agriculture Research 
Centres (IARCs) and other public research organisations increasingly find themselves 
in situations where they have to protect their research products through IPRs or where 
they use products protected by third parties. To fulfil their public goods mandate, these 
organisations have to exercise IPRs in a manner that mitigates their existence. There 
are ample examples in agriculture and elsewhere that illustrate that the existence of 
IPRs need not hinder the accessibility of protected technology by the public.  
 
But IARCs and other public research organisations particularly those in developing 
countries need to invest in IP capacity in order to use innovative IP management and 
strategies that address the paradox of using private rights in the provision of public 
goods. Some public research organisations and non profit organisations are currently 
experimenting with creative IP mitigation strategies such as humanitarian use and non-
assert licenses and open source biotechnology. Their uptake in common biotechnology 
practice is yet to be seen.  
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